Court of Appeal, March 10, 2026, Order, Retroactive Time Extension under R. 9.3(a) RoP – UPC_CoA_37/2026

• R. 320 RoP applies only where missing a time limit causes a party to lose a substantive right or means of redress, such as the right to initiate appeal proceedings or to challenge default judgments. Failure to meet a deadline for a written statement in ongoing proceedings does not trigger R. 320 RoP.
• The Court of Appeal confirmed the distinction previously established in Hanshow v. VusionGroup (UPC_CoA_618/2024). There is no circumvention of R. 320 RoP when R. 9.3(a) RoP is applied to extend a deadline for written pleadings in pending proceedings.

• R. 9.3(a) RoP does not prescribe a time limit for filing the extension request, nor does it require the request to be submitted before the deadline expires. The express reference to retroactive extensions would be meaningless if it only allowed the Court to issue an order after expiry.
• Under R. 9.1 RoP, the Court may on its own motion request parties to take steps at any stage, including after a missed deadline. It would be inconsistent to prevent a retroactive extension solely because the party’s request was filed after the deadline.
• Post-deadline extension requests do not render time limits absurd. Time limits remain binding and are not at the disposal of the parties; only the Court decides on such requests in exercising its procedural discretion.

The defendants relied on a Local Division Hamburg order (Lionra v. Cisco, UPC_CFI_58/2024), which held R. 9.3(a) RoP inapplicable after deadline expiry. The Court of Appeal found this distinguishable, as that case concerned a missed R. 151 RoP deadline falling within the scope of R. 320 RoP.

• The standard for discretionary review requires the impugned order to be manifestly incorrect or to raise a fundamental question of law necessitating consistent interpretation of the RoP. The stage and schedule of first-instance proceedings may also be considered (R. 220.4 RoP).
• The Local Division properly exercised its discretion under R. 9.3(a) RoP. It took all relevant circumstances into account and did not base its decision on false facts; accepting the filing of the wrong reply as human error was not manifestly erroneous.

The defendants’ right to be heard was preserved as they received the originally contemplated two-week period to respond. Allowing the review would have required an oral hearing at the Court of Appeal level, interfering with preparation for the scheduled first-instance hearing.